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IF DOROTHY HAD NOT HAD TOTO TO PULL 
BACK THE WIZARD’S CURTAIN:  THE 
FABRICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AS A 
WORLD RELIGION 
Richard Stith* 
ABSTRACT:  This paper examines the increasing penetration and control 
of nations by amorphous ideas of human rights, touching upon the symbiotic 
relation between global capital and human rights, the anti-democratic nature of 
many rights, the radically political nature of positive rights, the frequent absence 
of national self-esteem and the consequent yearning for supranational approval, 
the belief that judges and their surrogates are priests speaking for God, the 
search for validating judicial will as replacement for a dead God, loss of judicial 
confidence in reason, and banal judicial vanity.  These lead to the creation of the 
last and greatest Leviathan, a mortal god that can never be dethroned. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In the 1939 film, The Wizard of Oz,1 Dorothy and her friends 
undertake a pilgrim quest to the Emerald City of Oz, in the fervent belief 
that the wizard who rules that city has the preternatural power to save 
them from several perceived afflictions.  When Dorothy’s dog Toto pulls 
back the curtain that veils the wizard, the group discovers not only that 
the supposed wizard is in fact a charlatan without any special powers—
but also that they did not need the help of great magic, simply more self-
confidence.  If not for Toto, they might well have continued to depend on 
fake wizardry.  This essay suggests that the worldwide quest for human 
rights may likewise be founded in part on a lack of self-esteem coupled 
with the credulous veneration of wizards—without a Toto to reveal the 
all-too-human character behind the curtain.  It is worth examining the 
superhuman pretensions of some international human rights advocates 
and the strange sort of religion being fabricated to support those 
pretensions. 
The title of the panel for which this paper was prepared 
(“Implementing International Human Rights in the Domestic Context”) 
betrays an American parochialism.  The experience of much of the rest of 
the world belies the notion that such rights need to be “implemented” in 
order to become effective domestically.  That is, our dualist American 
separation of national from international law and our superpower status 
                                                 
* Professor, Valparaiso University School of Law.  A.B. (Harvard University); M.A. 
(University of California, Berkeley); Ph.D. (Yale University), J.D. (Yale Law School). 
1 THE WIZARD OF OZ (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios 1939). 
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have preserved for us a democratic choice rapidly disappearing around 
the world.  In Argentina and Mexico, for example, international law is 
directly effective and supreme2 over both prior and subsequent national 
legislation; in the case of Argentina, a good many human rights treaties 
actually become part of the constitution.3  Mexico’s treaty with the 
                                                 
2 Argentina:  Decisión de la Corte Suprema del 7 de julio de 1992 en el caso 
“Ekmekdjian, Miguel Ángel c/ Sofovich, Gerardo y otros.”  Art. 75 inciso 22 (first 
paragraph) of the Constitución Nacional reads:  “Los tratados y concordatos tienen 
jerarquía superior a las leyes.” (“Treaties and concordats rank higher than statutes.”)  
Mexico:  Tratados internacionales. Se ubican jerárquicamente por encima de las leyes federales y en 
un segundoplano respecto de la constitución federal.  9ª. Época; Pleno; S.J.F. y su Gaceta; X, 
Noviembre de 1999, página 46, Tesis: P. LXXVII/99 Tesis Aislada. Materia Constitucional, 
approved in prívate session 28 October 1999.  This thesis was first elaborated in the amparo 
en revisión 1475/98, Sindicato Nacional de Controladores de Tránsito Aéreo, 11 de mayo 
de 1999. 
3 Art. 75 inciso 22 of the Constitución Nacional of Argentina lists various constitution-
level human rights declarations and treaties: 
 La Declaración Americana de los Derechos y Deberes del 
Hombre; la Declaración Universal de Derechos Humanos; la 
Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos; el Pacto 
Internacional de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales; el 
Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos y su Protocolo 
Facultativo, la Convención sobre la Prevención y la Sanción del 
Delito de Genocidio; la Convención Internacional sobre la 
Eliminación de todas las Formas de Discriminación de races; la 
Convención Internacional sobre la Eliminación de todas las Formas 
de Discriminación contra la Mujer; la Convención contra la Tortura 
y otros Tratos o Penas Crueles, Inhumanos o Degradantes; la 
Convención sobre los Derechos del Niño; en las condiciones de su 
vigencia, tienen jerarquía constitucional, no derogan artículo alguno 
de la primera parte de esta Constitución y deben entenderse 
complementarios de los derechos y garantías por ella reconocidos. 
 (In English):  The American Declaration of the Rights and 
Duties of Man; the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; the 
American Convention on Human Rights; the International Pact on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the International Pact on Civil 
and Political Rights and its empowering Protocol; the Convention 
on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide; the International 
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial 
Discrimination; the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of 
Discrimination against Woman; the Convention against Torture and 
other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatments or Punishments; the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child; in the full force of their 
provisions, they have constitutional hierarchy, do not repeal any 
section of the First Part of this Constitution and are to be 
understood as complementing the rights and guarantees recognized 
herein.  
Translated in Georgetown University, Political Database of the Americas, available at 
http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Argentina/argen94_e.html (last visited Nov. 
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European Union authorizes a wide range of new secondary legislation 
by treaty-created bodies without further approval by any domestic 
legislature.4  The European Community treaties have all these effects 
among their signatory states.5 
A Dutch commentator recently summarized a common non-
American perspective: 
[I]nternational law influences and often determines the 
domestic rule of law . . . governing directly the legal 
rights and obligations of private persons who are located 
in domestic legal orders.  International law, particularly 
international human rights law, imposes such 
                                                                                                             
15, 2009).  Interpretations of these treaties by international tribunals may further affect the 
meaning of the Argentine constitution:  Corte Suprema, 23/12/2004, Espósito, Miguel A. 
4 The treaty states: 
 El Consejo Conjunto, a efectos de alcanzar los objetivos del 
presente Acuerdo, estará facultado para tomar decisiones en los casos 
previstos en el Acuerdo.  Las decisiones que se adopten tendrán 
carácter vinculante para las Partes, que tomarán las medidas necesarias 
para ejecutarlas.  El Consejo Conjunto podrá también hacer las 
recomendaciones pertinentes.   
 Las decisiones y recomendaciones se adoptarán previo acuerdo 
entre las dos Partes. 
Acuerdo de Asociación Económica, Concertación Política y Cooperación entre los Estados Unidos 
Mexicanos y la Comunidad Europea y sus Estados Miembros, art. 47, DIARIO OFICIAL DE LA 
FEDERACIÓN, 26 de Junio de 2000, Segunda Sección.  The Consejo Conjunto may delegate its 
functions to the more technical Comité Conjunto, whose decisions become equally binding.  
Id. art. 48(2).  Note that in the course of regulating trade, the Consejo may make judgments 
of “public morality.”  Id. art. 5(k).  And the Consejo will decide on abuses of economically 
dominant positions, including “state monopolies” and “public enterprises.”  Id. art. 11(2)(b, 
d, e).  “Human rights” are from the beginning declared to be an “essential element” of the 
treaty, all of which give Consejo (and the Comité) much discretion to develop the treaty.  
Id. art. 1.  Respect for “democratic principles” is also mentioned (id.), but no mechanism for 
referral to Mexican democratic institutions is anywhere to be found.  For a more detailed 
analysis of the Mexico-European Union Treaty of 2000, see Richard Stith, México:  
¿nuevamente una colonia europea?, in 2 JEAN MONNET/ROBERT SCHUMANN PAPER SERIES No. 
8, 2 (Mariela Arenas ed., 2003), available at http://www6.miami.edu/EUCenter/stith 
final.pdf. 
5 See Treaty Establishing the European Community for the direct effect of secondary 
regulations legislated by the treaty-created institutions and for the extremely wide scope of 
such secondary legislation.  Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European 
Community, 45 OFFICIAL J. OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES C325/33 (2002), available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/12002E/pdf/12002E_EN.pdf.  Its supremacy 
over member state law was originally asserted by the European Court of Justice in the 
following two cases:  Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der 
Belastinge, 1963 E.C.R. 1, 1963 C.M.L.R. 105 and Case 6/64 Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 585, 
1964 C.M.L.R. 425.  For a more detailed examination, see Richard T. Stith, El problema del 
alto tribunal no razonable, in DOS VISIONES NORTEAMERICANAS DE LA JURISDICCIÓN DE LA 
UNIÓN EUROPEA 29, 29–32 (Universidade de Santiago de Compostela 2000). 
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fundamental limitations on the power of government 
that in fact it has become hard to think of rule of law 
problems in the relationship between a state and its 
citizens that do not have some connection to 
international law.6 
How has this widespread global governance come about?  This short 
essay contends that one key factor has been the development of human 
rights as a kind of world religion.  Conversion to this new religion, in 
turn, arguably results from a coming together of two factors:  on the 
international side, what can be called “forces of domination,” and on the 
domestic side, what can be called “forces of surrender.” 
II.  FORCES OF DOMINATION 
Most obviously, capitalism prefers property and commerce rights to 
be immune to the erratic and redistributive impulses of popular 
majorities, for the sake of economic predictability and security.  Global 
capitalism is thus fundamentally anti-democratic, preferring uniform 
rules favoring capital imposed on all nations.  For example, it may 
demand that international treaties be made constitutionally supreme 
over subsequent domestic legislation in order to reassure foreign 
investors that they need not fear local legal surprises.  The “democratic 
deficit” has been labeled perhaps the “most severe” and “most serious” 
problem for the transnational legal order.7 
Those who perceive workers’ interests and environmental 
conservation to be endangered by free trade have long engaged in 
protest against this undemocratic globalization.  For example, back in 
1999, a full-page advertisement in the New York Times denounced the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) as “the world’s first global 
government.  But it was elected by no-one, it operates in secrecy, and its 
mandate is this:  To undermine the constitutional rights of sovereign 
nations.”8 
At first sight, it might seem that those who use the language of 
human rights would favor protecting national sovereignty and shielding 
                                                 
6 André Nollkaemper, The Internationalized Rule of Law, 1 HAGUE J. ON THE RULE OF L. 74, 
75 (2009).  Professor Kaemper directs the Amsterdam Center for International Law, 
University of Amsterdam. 
7 Jiunn-Rong Yeh & Wen-Chen Chang, The Emergence of Transnational Constitutionalism:  
Its Features, Challenges and Solutions, 27 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 89, 113 (2008). 
8 Invisible Government, Advertisement, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1999, at A15.  The ad 
indicates that the signers (which include, for example, Greenpeace and the United 
Steelworkers of America) “are all part of a coalition of more than 60 non-profit 
organizations that favor democratic, localized, ecologically sound alternatives. . . .” 
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citizens from the abuses of global capital through democratic legislation.  
This inference would be a mistake.  Except for political rights to 
democratic participation and rule, all rights are anti-democratic:  All are 
intended to be (sometimes insuperable) barriers to the will of the 
political community as disclosed by majority vote.9  Those interested in 
various sorts of human rights are not necessarily opposed to “invisible” 
or “secret” government, as long as their kind of rights, not just property-
related rights, get a cut of the action.  They, in turn, have something to 
offer to capital, i.e. legitimation.  Only when global governance comes to 
mean protection from domestic oppression, as opposed to merely 
protection from domestic property redistribution, is it likely to be 
accepted.10  (Franciscan friars did indeed humanize and soften the 
Spanish conquest of Mexico, and their motives may have been wholly 
benevolent.  Yet at the same time they legitimated and facilitated that 
conquest.11) 
Already in 1998, former human rights activist Kenneth Anderson12 
put the matter in suitably religious terms:   
                                                 
9 The anti-democratic character of rights is obscured when the word “democratic” is 
used for private freedoms that are unrelated either to a demos or to a kratos, as for example 
in the phrase “It is undemocratic for the state to tell citizens where they must worship.”  By 
contrast, “democratic” in the sense used in this paper refers always to majority-decision 
origin, not to private-rights content. 
10 Thomas M. Franck, Preface:  International Institutions:  Why Constitutionalize?, in RULING 
THE WORLD?  CONSTITUTIONALISM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE xiv 
(Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel Trachtman eds., 2009) [hereinafter RULING THE WORLD?] (quoting 
David Kennedy, The Mystery of Global Governance, in RULING THE WORLD?) 37, 40 
(describing and proposing world constitutionalism as a basis for international law).  The 
constitutional place of human rights in this scheme is spelled out in greatest detail by 
Mattias Kumm.  See Mattias Kumm, The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism:  On the 
Relationship between Constitutionalism in and beyond the State, in RULING THE WORLD?  258, 
303–10.  Stephen Gardbaum’s essay highlights the importance of human rights as a means 
of overcoming the delegitimation consequent upon supranational law’s endemic 
democracy deficit.  See generally Stephen Gardbaum, Human Rights and International 
Constitutionalism, in RULING THE WORLD? 233.  He notes that “No one talks of a democracy 
deficit in the European Convention on Human Rights[,]” and  
[t]he story of the transformation of the European Union from a treaty-
based to a supranational entity is now, of course, too familiar to 
require details . . . [Member states’] sovereignty was limited and 
partially transferred to a vertical, supranational system of 
international law.  In this transformation, human rights famously 
played no intrinsic role but rather only an instrumental or pragmatic 
one as the sugar helping certain member state courts to swallow the 
pill. 
Id. at 235, 246. 
11  T.R. FEHRENBACH, FIRE AND BLOOD 204–08 (DaCapo Press 1995). 
12 Professor Anderson recounts some of his activist experience in The Ottawa Convention 
Banning Landmines, the Role of International Non-Governmental Organizations and the Idea of 
International Civil Society, 11 EUR. J. INT’L L. 91, 91–120 (2000). 
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Painting such groups as human rights organizations and 
the like as fundamentally in tension with transnational 
capital is simply an illusion.  If the global 
nongovernmental movement, as a key agent of 
internationalism, sees itself as a kind of “Sunday School 
of the nations,” schooling them in their moral duties, it is 
able to do so . . .  [while global capital] serves as the 
battering ram to make societies accessible and malleable 
to internationalism itself.13 
Let us look at a relatively non-controversial example of non-
democratic human rights hubris, the fabrication of the right to water.  
Since no one is against drinking, we can avoid disputes concerning the 
right’s core content and focus instead on its pedigree and on the 
coherence of the many peripheral rights derived from it.14 
The “right to water” is nowhere explicitly mentioned as a right per se 
in any global treaty.15  Yet the United Nations’ Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights has indicated in eighteen-page detail what the 
“right to water” requires and how it will be enforced.16 
Note first that this Committee, like other U.N. treaty-monitoring 
bodies, need be made up neither of jurists, nor of economists, nor of 
engineers or other technical experts.  The only requirement is that its 
members “shall be experts with recognized competence in the field of 
human rights.”17  It does not operate as a court, with rules guaranteeing 
fair submission of evidence and argument on both sides.  Nevertheless, 
the Committee felt jurisdictionally competent to issue General Comment 
No. 15,18 indicating in legal language precisely how the International 
                                                 
13 Kenneth Anderson, Secular Eschatologies and Class Interests of the Internationalized New 
Class, in RELIGION AND HUMAN RIGHTS:  COMPETING CLAIMS 109, 113 (Carrie Gustafson & 
Peter Juviler eds., 1999). 
14 Of course, in an inspirational sense, all post-war human rights claims can be said to 
originate in the recognition of the “inherent dignity” of all human beings.   See The 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights pmbl., Dec. 10, 1948 (“Whereas recognition of the 
inherent dignity . . . of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, 
justice and peace in the world[]”); Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany art. 1, 
para. 1, May 23, 1949 (“Die Würde des Menschen ist unantastbar.”). 
15 This is not to say that no treaty ever refers to individual entitlements to water in 
certain contexts. 
16 U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm. on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,  General Comment No. 15, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2002/11 
(Jan. 20, 2003), available at http://www.fao.org/righttofood/KC/downloads/vl/docs/ 
AH355.pdf. 
17 U.N. Economic and Social Council Res. 1985/17 (May 28, 1985). 
18 United Nations, Substantive Issues, supra note 16. 
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Covenant on Economic and Social Rights19 requires the right to water to 
be implemented world-wide. 
Paragraph 3 of the General Comment begins with a claim of treaty 
textual support: 
Article 11, paragraph 1, of the Covenant specifies . . . the 
right to an adequate standard of living “including 
adequate food, clothing and housing”.  The use of the 
word “including” indicates that this catalogue of rights 
was not intended to be exhaustive.  The right to water 
clearly falls within the category of guarantees essential 
for securing an adequate standard of living . . . .  The 
right to water is also inextricably related to . . . the rights 
to adequate housing and adequate food . . . .20 
Paragraph 6 elaborates:  “water is necessary to produce food.”21  Yet 
it goes on simply to announce:  “Nevertheless, priority in the allocation 
of water must be given to the right to water for personal and domestic 
uses.”22  Without missing a beat, it somehow manages to make many 
other things also prior:  “Priority should also be given to the water 
resources required to prevent starvation and disease, as well as water 
required to meet the core obligations of each of the Covenant rights.”23 
Paragraph 11 warns us further not to imagine some easy, mechanical 
way to comply with this right:  “The adequacy of water should not be 
interpreted narrowly, by mere reference to volumetric quantities and 
technologies.  Water should be treated as a social and cultural good, and 
not primarily as an economic good.”24 
Paragraph 14 warns that “investments should not disproportionately 
favour expensive water supply services and facilities that are often 
accessible only to a small, privileged fraction of the population, rather 
than investing in services and facilities that benefit a far larger part of the 
population.”25  Yet Paragraph 16(h) indicates somewhat to the contrary 
that “persons . . . living in arid and semi-arid areas, or on small islands 
are [to be] provided with safe and sufficient water.”26  If the few persons 
                                                 
19 See generally GAOR, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
(Dec. 16, 1966), http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b36c0.html. 
20 UNITED NATIONS, Substantive Issues, supra note 16, ¶ 3. 
21 Id. ¶ 6. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. ¶ 11. 
25 Id. ¶ 14. 
26 Id. ¶ 16(h). 
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living in such regions have to move to cheaper water supplies, their 
human rights apparently will have been violated. 
Paragraph 34 declares water-related duties to extend beyond 
national borders, “Depending on the availability of resources, States 
should facilitate realization of the right to water in other countries, for 
example through provision of water resources . . . [,]”27 adding in 
Paragraph 38, “[f]or the avoidance of any doubt, the Committee wishes 
to emphasize that it is particularly incumbent on States parties . . . to 
provide international assistance . . . .”28  The rights to water declared by 
the Committee must be taken into account whenever a state enters an 
international agreement.29  
Enforcement mechanisms take up many pages of the Committee’s 
General Comment 15, but only a few quotations are needed to see the 
degree of supranational tutelage required:  Paragraph 47 indicates that 
“States parties [have] an obligation to adopt a national strategy or plan of 
action to realize the right to water[,]” and that in so doing “States parties 
should avail themselves of technical assistance and cooperation of the 
United Nations specialized agencies . . . .”30  Paragraph 54 adds “During 
the periodic reporting procedure, the Committee will engage in a process 
of . . . joint consideration by the State party and the Committee of the 
indicators and national benchmarks which will then provide the targets 
to be achieved during the next reporting period [five years later].”31 
Although the realization of many of the declared rights to water 
rights is thus progressive, i.e. there is no duty to fully comply at once, 
“States parties must establish that they have taken the necessary and 
feasible steps[,]” acting “in good faith to take such steps.”32  Failure to do 
so “amounts to a violation of the right.”33  Much is expected:  “A State 
which is unwilling to use the maximum of its available resources for the 
realization of the right to water is in violation of its obligations under the 
Covenant.”34  As an example of treaty violation, Paragraph 44(c)(ii) 
mentions “insufficient expenditure or misallocation of public resources 
which results in the non-enjoyment of the right to water by individuals 
or groups . . . .”35 
                                                 
27 Id. ¶ 34. 
28 Id. ¶ 38. 
29 Id. ¶ 44(c)(vii). 
30 Id. ¶ 47. 
31 Id. ¶ 54. 
32 Id. ¶ 40. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. ¶ 41. 
35 Id. ¶ 44(c)(ii). 
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What can be said of the Committee’s work?  There is no doubt that 
the world faces a crisis regarding the need for water.36  The question is 
whether cock-sure activist intervention and a quasi-judicial enforcement 
style, the creation and imposition on states of duties to provide water 
that are contradictory, impossible to fulfill completely, and only 
tendentiously treaty-based, is the best way to proceed, as opposed to 
letting real jurists and technical experts hammer out workable 
international treaties and national legislation.37  In the absence of any 
binding enforcement power by this and other U.N. treaty-monitoring 
bodies—or even a fair and official dispute resolution mechanism 
entrusted to the bodies—there would no doubt be much national 
resistance to the pretentions of the political activists on such committees 
were it not for the “forces of surrender” to be examined below. 
However, before turning to those receptive forces, one should look 
more deeply at an inherent tension between any massive number of 
rights and democracy, quite apart from the additional problems of 
pedigree and competence presented by the new rights fabricated by 
monitoring bodies of lay human rights activists.38 
When rights are few and negative (requiring only that the state leave 
individuals alone in certain spheres), a large field is left open to 
democratic choice.  That is, even when rights are meant completely to 
trump majority goals, where rights ask for little there may well be a way 
to achieve those goals without abrogating the rights in question.  This is 
no longer so where rights expand to cover most human goods.  If the 
                                                 
36 Joseph W. Dellapenna’s recent article is an excellent summary of the crisis and of the 
range of legal solutions available.  See generally Joseph W. Dellapenna, International Water 
Law in a Climate of Disruption, 17 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 43 (2008).  For a close study of the 
complexity of one part of the relevant law, see OWEN MCINTYRE, ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION OF INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW (Ashgate 
2007). 
37 For a critique of the rights approach to water from a proponent of global capitalism, 
favoring leaving water largely in the hands of the market, see Kendra Okonski, Is Water a 
Human Right?, 24 THE NEW ATLANTIS 61, 61–73 (Spring 2009), available at 
http://www.thenewatlantis.com/docLib/20090617_TNA24Okonski.pdf.  See also Owen 
McIntyre, Water Services Privatization and Recognition of the Human Right to Water in 
International Investment Law—Finding Fertile Ground in Unlikely Places, Presentation on 
Global Justice and Sustainable Development organized by the International Law 
Association:  Committee on International Law and Sustainable Development (Aug. 26–27, 
2009) (on file with the Valparaiso University Law Review) (Prof. McIntyre argues that, 
contrary to the assumptions of many, the human right to water is compatible with 
privatization, albeit with some complexities).   
38 For quite different critiques of rights-based regimes, focusing on their excessive 
individualism, see Richard Stith, The Priority of Respect, 44 INT’L PHIL. Q. 165 (2004); Richard 
Stith, Generosity:  A Duty Without a Right, 25 J. OF VALUE INQUIRY 203 (1991). 
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private achievement of almost any good overrides majority preferences, 
little room for democratic choice remains. 
Furthermore, as they multiply, rights cannot maintain their near-
absolute character, for they inevitably clash one with another.  Some sort 
of hierarchy, or at least a balancing technique, has to be applied to 
determine which rights must give way. 
It might seem that democratic voting would reenter here, to 
determine the balance or hierarchy of rights.  However, this is not so, 
except where the rights flow only from some positive law source within 
a legislature’s competence (e.g., a constitution able to be legislatively 
amended).  For rights in the full sense are legal entitlements, not just 
competing social interests or desires.  So only judicial or quasi-judicial 
authorities (using reasoned elaboration of general norms to decide 
cases), and not legislatures (representing the will of the people in 
formulating general norms), are competent to decide the concrete weight 
to be given to each right. 
Yet at the same time, rights to various human goods, like the goods 
at which they aim, are often incommensurable, or nearly so, especially 
with the postmodern loss of Enlightenment confidence in reason.  In our 
multicultural world, it is difficult or impossible to determine by reasoned 
deliberation an order of priority among clashing rights to form a family, 
to education, to work, to health, to worship God, and all the rest.  Acts of 
will, of free choice, are needed to decide such conflicts.  Only 
legislatures, not courts, are authorized so to act. 
Thus choice among rights can be done neither by legislatures 
(because legitimation by reason is needed) nor by courts (because 
legitimation by will is needed). 
Furthermore, many of the commonly proclaimed international 
rights, such as the right to water, are positive rather than negative.  
Everyone’s negative right to water would require only that the state not 
act to cut off anyone’s hydration.  Everyone’s positive right to water, as 
examined above, would require that the state act to supply all with 
hydration.  These positive rights are even less rationally adjudicable than 
negative rights.  After all, a state could uphold an infinite number of 
potentially conflicting rights if the rights in question were completely 
negative—via the simple recourse of doing absolutely nothing.  But with 
positive rights, there is no escape from choices among incommensurable 
alternatives.  Suppose resources are limited and either the right to health 
can be honored with a new hospital or the right to education can be 
honored with a new university, but not both.  Which right is to be 
deemed superior? 
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Moreover, positive rights are typically not just rights to have the 
state act but rights to have the state act effectively, i.e. rights to a result, 
such as the provision of water.  But the future is always uncertain.  
Rainfall and climate may vary.  Rules for action or inaction, the stuff of 
ordinary litigation, can in principle be clear and even absolute, but the 
means needed to effect results are always tentative and contingent.  
Judicial reason is not enough to decide between alternatives here.  An 
educated guess followed by an authoritative act of will, i.e. a legislative 
choice, is needed to choose a plan for the future.  But if judicial reasoning 
cannot reach such a conclusion and no binding international legislature 
has been created to do so, no such mandate can be legitimate. 
Without the ability to achieve legitimacy, either through careful 
judicial elaboration of already binding norms or through the will of the 
peoples of the world, how can a new list of positive international human 
rights requirements, like those proclaimed under “the right to water,” be 
made effective?  Only one answer is possible:  by dogmatic 
proclamation, Roma locuta est (“Rome has spoken”), backed up with guilt 
and shame for those who refuse to comply.  Cut off from any other 
foundation, the option of a new religious authority is the only one left for 
human rights activists. 
This missionary spirit is not hidden.  The website for UNESCO 
begins with these words under “About UNESCO”: 
 UNESCO—the United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) was 
founded on 16 November 1945.  For this specialized 
United Nations agency, it is not enough to build 
classrooms in devastated countries or to publish 
scientific breakthroughs.  Education, Social and Natural 
Science, Culture and Communication are the means to a 
far more ambitious goal:  to build peace in the minds of 
men.   
 Today, UNESCO functions as a laboratory of ideas 
and a standard-setter to forge universal agreements on 
emerging ethical issues.39 
To the end of forging such agreements, where none now exist, novice 
missionaries must be catechized and sent forth.  Thus the June 2009 
UNESCO “International Guidelines on Sexuality Education” indicate 
                                                 
39 UNESCO, What is it it?  What Does it do?, http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php- 
URL_ID=3328&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html (last visited Nov. 8, 
2009). 
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that children as young as fifteen are to be taught “Advocacy to promote 
the right to and access to safe abortion.”40 
Yet the U.N.’s is a strange religion, one with many dogmas but 
without a theology—i.e., without a systematic understanding that ranks 
all rights and relates them to the premise of inherent human dignity.41  
The result is what Kenneth Anderson has called “serial absolutism”42:  
activist proclamation of each right as an absolute demand, before going 
on to another, potentially conflicting, absolute, as we saw in the various 
contradictory rights to water. 
This repeatedly-cascading disintegration (in the set of human rights) 
conflicts, moreover, with the rule of law itself.  If “priority in the 
allocation of water must be given to the right to water for personal and 
domestic uses” and “must also be given to the water resources required 
to prevent starvation and disease,” a nation can always be held in 
violation and subject to censure (or “name and shame” as the activists 
like to call it).43  Conflicting, incommensurable, mutable duties do not 
provide the notice essential to the rule of law.44  Why would nations 
genuflect before them? 
                                                 
40 UNESCO, International Guidelines on Sexuality Education:  An Evidence Informed 
Approach to Effective Sex, Relationships and HIV/STI Education 42 (2009), available at 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0018/001832/183281e.pdf.  Despite its “evidence 
informed” subtitle, no evidence for or against abortion or abortion rights is included in the 
proposed sexuality curriculum guide; the right to abortion is simply proclaimed.  
Conservative opposition to the guidelines (calling them, e.g., a “one-size-fits-all approach 
that’s damaging to cultures, religions and to children[]”) may result in their revision.  
Steven Erlanger, U.N. Guide for Sex Ed Generates Opposition, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2009, at A6. 
41 Even as human rights gain ever-increasing global force, the ideological core of human 
rights, the idea of inherent human dignity [see supra note 14] may itself be in the process of 
disintegration.  On the one hand, efforts are being made to recognize the dignity of animals 
and even of plants.  The Swiss Constitution  speaks in Article 120(2) of the “dignity of the 
creature” including the plant.  See BUNDESVERFASSUNG DER SCHWEIZERISCHEN 
EIDGENOSSENSCHAFT [Constitution] art. 120(2) (Switz.) (“Der Bund erlässt Vorschriften 
über den Umgang mit Keim- und Erbgut von Tieren, Pflanzen und anderen Organismen.  
Er trägt dabei der Würde der Kreatur . . . .”).  On the other hand, the idea of “dignity” is 
itself under attack.  Human autonomy rather than human dignity is to be respected.  See 
generally Steven Pinker, The Stupidity of Dignity, THE NEW REPUBLIC, May 28, 2008, available 
at http://www.tnr.com/article/the-stupidity-dignity, reviewed by Open to Interpretation, 
NATURE, June 12, 2008, at 824, available at http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v453/ 
n7197/pdf/453824b.pdf.  But few if any animals or plants are capable of autonomy in the 
sense of human free choice.  Will non-autonomous non-humans have rights while only 
autonomous humans have rights?  Belief in such a religion will be a challenge. 
42 John Fonte, Democracy’s Trojan Horse, 76 THE NATIONAL INTEREST 117, 125 (2004), 
available at http://hudson.org/files/publications/fonte_national_interest_summer_04.pdf. 
43 United Nations, Substantive Issues, supra note 16. 
44 Kristina Morvai of Hungary, then a member of the treaty-monitoring body for the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Discrimination Against Women, has made this very 
point, stating that “one of the basic principles of the Rule of Law is that interpretations of 
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III.  FORCES OF SURRENDER 
It is easy to see why global capital would need a human rights 
crusade to cover up its seizure of world power and not hard to discern 
how nations could be pressured financially to go along.  After all, to be 
excluded from the WTO or the World Bank as a human rights pariah 
would be to incur significant material deprivations.  But many nations 
do more than just go along with international human rights; they 
welcome them.  Why would they happily surrender their sovereignty 
and the rule of law to dogmatic activists who possess no coherent 
program with which all nations agree? 
For many nations with a Judeo-Christian heritage, one answer may 
be that they have long been waiting for a world-wide messianic era.  
After all, it is only in the context of the submission of all nations to 
Jerusalem that Isaiah could prophesy “they shall beat their swords into 
ploughshares.”45  Pope Benedict XVI’s recent encyclical Caritas in Veritate 
states “there is urgent need of a true world political authority . . . vested with 
the effective power to ensure security for all, regard for justice, and 
respect for rights.”46  Like the Aztecs who mistook the Spanish 
conquistador for the returning god Quetzalcoatl, Roman Catholic nations, 
of Latin America in particular, may see the agents of human rights as 
God’s messengers.47  More generally, devout and conservative nations 
throughout the world may imagine a divine inspiration behind the 
oracular pontifications of the U.N. and its treaty monitoring bodies. 
                                                                                                             
the law must be coherent and consistent, and decisions based on the law must be 
predictable and foreseeable,” concluding that as long as treaty bodies engage in “creative 
interpretation” they are “largely incompatible” with the rule of law and thus cannot be 
accepted as legally binding.  Kristina Morvai, Respecting National Sovereignty and 
Restoring International Law:  The Need to Reform UN Treaty Monitoring Committees, 
Briefing at UN Headquarters, New York (Sept. 6, 2006), quoted in DOUGLAS SYLVA & SUSAN 
YOSHIHARA, RIGHTS BY STEALTH:  THE ROLE OF UN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY BODIES IN THE 
CAMPAIGN FOR AN INTERNATIONAL RIGHT TO ABORTION 35 (The International Organizations 
Research Group 2006), available at http://www.c-fam.org/docLib/20080425_Number_8_ 
Rights_By _Stealth.pdf.  For further, probing analysis of the dilemmas of positive rights, 
see Susan Yoshihara, The Quest for Happiness: How the UN's Advocacy of Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights Undermines Liberty and Opportunity, in CONUNDRUM: THE LIMITS OF THE 
UNITED NATIONS AND THE SEARCH FOR ALTERNATIVES (Brett D. Schaefer ed., 2009). 
45 Isaiah 2:4. 
46 POPE BENEDICT XVI, CARITAS IN VERITATE ¶ 67 (2009), available at 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/encyclicals/documents/hf_ben_xvi_en
c_20090629_caritas_in_veritate_en.html. 
47 Mary Ann Glendon argues that Catholic traditions have made Latin American nations 
leading advocates of positive social and economic rights.  See generally Mary Ann Glendon, 
The Forgotten Crucible:  The Latin American Influence on the Universal Rights Idea, 16 HARV. 
HUM. RTS. J. 27 (2003). 
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Not the presence but the loss of faith may also be operative.  It was 
lack of confidence in themselves that led the lion, the scarecrow, and the 
tin woodman to turn to the wizard of Oz to save them.  Kenneth 
Anderson suggests that a worldwide deconstructive attack may be 
operative:  “The global market penetrates what remains of traditional 
societies with its irresistible consumer goods and saturates all places 
with the media message, its own form of the good news, that the world 
is one and cultural differences are nothing more than differences in 
consumer preferences.”48  Human rights then step in to fill the ensuing 
moral and spiritual void.  Human rights provide a gratefully received 
“foundationalism[,]”49 once the old religions have been destroyed by 
consumerism.  Those who judge such rights are the “new priests of civil 
society,” according to Quebec Chief Justice Michel Robert.50 
Those nations, such as Argentina, that have committed obvious past 
atrocities no doubt feel a special need to be utterly deferential and 
contrite before the “new priests.”  But humility is guaranteed for many 
other countries by the impossibility of compliance with all the 
requirements of contradictory human rights.  Like Luther’s use of the 
law to “increase transgressions[,]”51 human rights demands may be so 
difficult and unending that they function to cow nations into submission.  
Already ashamed at being poor and backward, a state may sense that it 
may never have the means fully to supply all positive rights, or even just 
the right to water.  Such a government may seek to prove its sincere 
intentions by abject apologies and repeated confessions of absolute faith 
in human rights, and wholesale surrender to the demands of the 
authorities claiming to articulate those rights. 
Yet the plight to which the new religion of human rights responds 
should not be seen as one which afflicts only societies that still seek a 
god.  Human rights also meet a special postmodern need. 
                                                 
48 See Anderson, supra note 13, at 112. 
49 Yeh & Chang, supra note 7, at 108. 
50 Cristin Schmitz, Quebec’s Chief Justice Sees a Need to Change Traditional Legal Training, 24 
LAW. WEEKLY, No. 1 (May 7, 2004). 
51 MARTIN LUTHER, A COMMENTARY ON ST. PAUL’S EPISTLE TO THE GALATIANS 298 (James 
Clarke & Co. Ltd. 1953).  In his On Christian Liberty, Luther explains that commandments 
which are impossible to fulfill have the function of teaching man to “despair of his own 
ability . . . .  For example, the commandment ‘You shall not covet’ [Exod. 20:17], is a 
command which proves us all to be sinners, for no one can avoid coveting no matter how 
much he may struggle against it.”  MARTIN LUTHER, ON CHRISTIAN LIBERTY 11–12 (W. A. 
Lambert trans., Fortress Press 2003).  “Therefore, . . . a man is compelled to despair of 
himself, to seek the help which he does not find in himself elsewhere . . . .”  Id. at 12.  
Luther, of course, had man seek that help in God rather than in a United Nations.  Id. 
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The postmodern world of many or most Western societies, the world 
where God and even reason are dead, has been well described by J.H.H. 
Weiler: 
[T]here is no doubt that the notion that all observations 
are relative to the perception of the observer, that what 
we have are just competing narratives, has moved from 
being a philosophic position to a social reality.  It is part 
of political discourse:  multiculturalism is premised on it 
as are the breakdown of authority (political, scientific, 
social) and the ascendant culture of extreme 
individualism and subjectivity.  Indeed, objectivity itself 
is considered a constraint on freedom—a strange 
freedom, to be sure, empty of content.52 
In such a world, no legal “theology” could survive.  No rational system 
of thought could withstand postmodern skepticism.  Every foundation 
would turn to sand.  And yet the human need for validation does not 
disappear.  As John Rawls has written, “unless our endeavors are 
appreciated by our associates it is impossible for us to maintain the 
conviction that they are worthwhile[.]”53  The amorphous “serial 
absolutism” of the human rights world is the answer to this conundrum:  
It is precisely those accustomed to doubt all truths who are the least self-
sufficient in securing their own self-respect, who must conform to, or 
generate, some political correctness in order to validate their desire to be 
considered persons of moral decency.  In the absence of any faith in God 
or reason, political approval stands as psychological surrogate for truth.  
Certitude can be achieved only by the elimination of all open opposition.  
Thus the passionate need for final moral victory before the highest legal 
authorities of the world. 
Even those occupying the seats of those authorities, even justices on 
the highest courts of the world, must feel this need.  Absent faith in the 
correctness of their own decisions, they must rely on some outside 
assurance of the worthiness of their opinions.  I recall hearing United 
States Supreme Court Chief Justice William Rehnquist admit to being at 
a loss for words at a cocktail party with Canadian justices.  “We cite you.  
Why don’t you cite us?” they asked him.  He said he felt embarrassed 
                                                 
52  J.H.H. Weiler, To Be a European Citizen: Eros and Civilization, in J.H.H. WEILER, THE 
CONSTITUTION OF EUROPE: “DO THE NEW CLOTHES HAVE AN EMPEROR” AND OTHER ESSAYS 
ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 324, 331 (1999). 
53 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 441 (Belknap Press 1971).  For an extensive 
examination of the logic of validation, see Richard Stith, Punishment, Invalidation, and 
Nonvalidation, 14 LEGAL THEORY 219 (2008). 
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and decided to make more effort to cite them in the future.54  In other 
words, Canadian jurisprudence would begin to have some weight in 
United States Supreme Court decisions so that Chief Justice Rehnquist 
could earn the approval of his peers in Canada.  Human rights 
enforcement offers itself as an obvious transnational task in which high 
courts throughout the world can collaborate and compete for acceptance 
and prestige. 
Anne-Marie Slaughter’s seminal work generalizes this observation; 
she shows that judges (like many other professionals) seek validation for 
their acts from their increasingly transnational peers.55  Courts and 
quasi-courts will decide cases according to what they predict their peers 
(or their most prestigious peers) will decide, and world jurisprudence 
will approach unanimity.56 
No one will be able to argue with these tribunals, for they will not 
claim a basis in text or reason.  They will just be RIGHT and that is it.  If 
one were trapped under a national dictator by this rejection of reason, 
even if there were no possible physical escape, the mere fact that there 
was an outside—some other authority somewhere—might give one the 
strength to maintain a critical spirit.  But the unfolding international 
human rights religion will be universally established.  An “immense 
tutelary power”57 will have been created with nothing at all beyond its 
jurisdiction. 
                                                 
54 William Rehnquist, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, Oral 
Presentation at Georgetown University Conference on Comparative Constitutional Law:  
Defining the Field (Sept. 1999). 
55 ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 65–103 (2004). 
56 I have suggested that, in order to have some hope of avoiding this fate, legal 
interpretation (in this case of human rights) must be shared with non-judicial institutions 
which rely on religious or other independent cultural interpretive traditions and are thus 
relatively immune to the need for approval by judicial peers.  Richard Stith, Securing the 
Rule of Law Through Interpretive Pluralism:  An Argument from Comparative Law, 35 HASTINGS 
CONST. L.Q. 401, 434 n.105 (2008). 
57 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 663 (Harvey C. Mansfield & Delba 
Winthrop eds. & trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 2000). 
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